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The Advisory Opinion on Separation
of Powers: The Uncertain Contours
of Advisory Opinion Jurisprudence
in Rhode Island
Mel A. Topf*

Those who have given up on ordinarypolitics and the legislative process will not be unduly distressed if most important
controversies are entrusted to the courts for decision.'

I. THE

ADVISORY OPINION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS

During its 1998-1999 term, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
had before it one of the most politically contentious issues in the
state's modem history: the common and longstanding practice of
legislators serving and appointing others to serve on public and
quasi-public executive branch boards and commissions, 2 and the
extent to which this practice may violate the state constitution's
separation of powers provision. 3 The justices' "much anticipated"
opinion 4 came on June 29, 1999. Events leading to the justices'
opinion began in October 1995, when the Rhode Island Ethics
Commission voted unanimously to issue a draft code of ethics for
* Professor of Communications, Roger Williams University. B.A. Long Island University, M.A. New York University, Ph.D. Pennsylvania State University.
My grateful acknowledgements to Rae B. Condon, Esq. and Professor Robert
Whorf for their helpful discussions and advice; to Professor Whorf for his review of
an early draft; to J. Stephen Grimes, Archivist, Rhode Island Judicial Records
Center; and to the Law Review editors and staff for their many improvements and
corrections.
1. Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 182 (1991).
2. Hereinafter, these are referred to simply as boards and commissions.
3. See R.I. Const. art. V (stating that "the powers of the government shall be
distributed into three departments: the legislative, executive and judicial").
4. Tom Mooney, Court Close to Ruling on 'Power' Case, Prov. J. Bull., June
18, 1999, at B1.
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public comment.6 Among the provisions was a new prohibition
against legislators serving on or appointing others to serve on
boards and commissions. 6
Commission members apparently had concerns early on, both
about their authority to create the ban and about the constitutionality of the ban itself. In November 1995, at a public hearing on
the proposed regulation, they asked the Governor (who was in attendance) to seek an opinion from the justices of the state supreme
court. He promised to do so. 7 In January 1996, the commission
agreed to move ahead with the required procedures to create the
ban.8 This began a public disagreement between the commission
and its executive director, who strongly expressed doubts about the
constitutionality of the rule. In fact, the executive director stated
that adoption of the rule would be "a grave mistake."9 Also, curiously, the commission's legal counsel refused to offer his opinion,

5. See Ethics Commission Minutes, Oct. 10, 1995 (on file with author). The
draft, entitled Code of Ethics (Proposed), was issued the same date.
6. See Ethics Commission, Code of Ethics (Proposed) 24 (Oct. 10, 1995):
No members of the general assembly shall serve as a member or participate in the appointment of any other person to serve as a member of the
governing board of a quasi-public board, authority, or corporation while
serving in the general assembly, said prohibition as to a member of the
general assembly shall continue for a period of one (1) year after he or she
leaves legislative office.
7. See Ethics Commission, Proceeding at Hearing in re Code of Ethics (Proposed) [transcript], Nov. 16, 1995, at 7 (on file with author) ("Governor Almond: ...
I would say if requested by the commission that I would seek an advisory opinion
•.. on the very issue of the power of this commission, and the issue of the separation of powers."). It is difficult to determine when laws and regulations have been
drafted in Rhode Island under the condition that an advisory opinion will determine their constitutionality. In general, there has been relatively little study of
drafting processes. See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law
Originalismin Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation:Implicationsfor the
Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 44 (1998) ("ITihere are
surprisingly large gaps in the political science and legal literature relating to the
politics and processes of legislative drafting.").
8. See Ethics Commission Minutes, Jan. 31, 1996 (on file with author).
9. Randall Richard, Ethics Panel Votes to Hire Legal Expert, Prov. J. Bull.,
July 27, 1996, at Al:
According to [commission executive director] Healy, it would be a grave
mistake for the commission to adopt broad rules that would ban legislators from serving on so-called quasi-public agencies ....

Not only would

the ban be unconstitutional, said Healy, but it would also severely damage the commission's credibility.
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but rather suggested that the commission hire a legal expert. 10 He
recommended Professor Geoffrey Hazard, a specialist in legal ethics, whom the commission hired." Hazard agreed that the proposed ban "exceeded the authority conferred on the commission by
the Rhode Island Constitution."' 2 Hazard's opinions notwithstanding, the commission moved ahead with the adoption of the
ban, and on May 5, 1997 unanimously passed Regulation 36-145014.13
The Governor asked the justices for an opinion in November
1997. His letter inquired both about the commission's authority to
create the rule (Question 1) and about the constitutionality of legislators sitting on executive boards and commissions (Questions 2
and 3). The Governor's letter did not inquire about the constitu4
tionality of Regulation 5014 itself.'
10. See Ethics Commission, Public Hearing [transcript], July 26, 1996, at 60
(on file with author). See also Richard, supra note 9, at Al ("[Legal counsel] Gary
Yesser... demurred when [executive director] Healey suggested it was Yesser's
job to advise the commission on the constitutionality of the proposed ban.").
11. See Ethics Commission Minutes, July 26, 1996 (on file with author); Public
Hearing, supra note 10, at 23-27; Richard, supra note 9, at Al.
12. Letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard to the Ethics Commission (Aug. 9, 1996),
quoted in In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d 55, 67 (R.I. 1999). See
Brief of the Attorney General, at 19 No. 97-572-M.P.; Gerald M. Carbone, Ethics
Commission Prohibits Gifts, Prov. J. Bull., Aug. 29, 1996, at B8.
13. See Ethics Commission Minutes, May 5, 1997. Regulation 5014 provides:
(1) No member of the General Assembly shall serve as a member of a
Public Board. No member of the General Assembly shall participate in
the appointment, except through advice and consent as provided by law,
of any other person to serve as a member of a Public Board.
(2) For purposes of this regulation, "Public Board" means all public bodies
within the executive branch of state government, and all state executive,
public and quasi-public boards, authorities, corporations, commissions,
councils or agencies; provided, however, that the foregoing definition shall
not apply to any such entity which (i) functions solely in an advisory capacity, or (ii) exercises solely legislative functions.
(3) The effective date of this regulation is July 1, 1999.
14. See Letter from the Governor to the Justices of the Supreme Court (Nov.
20, 1997). The questions are:
(1) Does Article III, section 8 of the Rhode Island Constitution, which empowers the Rhode Island Ethics Commission to "adopt a code of ethics,
including, but not limited to provisions on conflicts of interest,... [and]
use of position" provide the Ethics Commission with the power to adopt
Regulation 36-14-5014?
(2) Is the principle of separation of powers contained in the Rhode Island
Constitution properly interpreted in the same fashion as it has been interpreted in the United States Constitution with respect to appointments,
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Soon after the Supreme Court received the Governor's letter, it
issued an order inviting briefs. 15 Twelve amici briefs were filed (in
addition to those from the Governor and Ethics Commission), reflecting a large degree of public interest. The briefs, over a thousand pages in all, were submitted by, among others, the Rhode
Island Senate, the Rhode Island House of Representatives, the current and past Attorneys General, the Rhode Island State Council of
Churches, and the American Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island. 16 Oral arguments before the justices took place on November
10, 1998, and lasted some five hours, with five proponents of the
ban and seven opponents presenting arguments. 17 Nearly eight
months later, on June 29, 1999, the justices rendered their opinion.' 8 This was nearly four years after the commission had first
put forth the proposed ban.
During all this time, nearly four years, there was almost no
interest expressed in the fact that what the justices were issuing
was an advisory opinion. In other words, no concern was expressed
regarding the fact that: no litigated case was before the Court and
no decision would be issued; the opinion would be rendered not by
the Court but by the individual justices; and it would be simply
advice, non-binding and without precedential weight. 19 Further,
the Governor's request overstepped at least two restrictions the
justices had previously imposed on such requests. 20 None of this
such that neither legislators, nor their appointees, may serve on any public body within the executive branch of state government, or state executive, public and quasi-public boards, authorities, corporations, commissions, councils or agencies except those which: (i) function solely in an advisory capacity; or (ii) exercise solely legislative functions?
(3) Does the separation of powers principle contained in the Rhode Island
Constitution impose any limits whatsoever on legislative appointments to
a public board or body (as defined above)? In particular, does the Constitution prohibit legislators and/or their appointees from constituting a majority of the membership of a public board or body? Does the Constitution
prohibit appointment of sitting legislators to a public board or body?
15. See Supreme Court Order, Nov. 26, 1997, at 2.
16. A complete listing of briefs is contained in In re Advisory Opinion, 732
A.2d at 63.
17. Notes of the author, who attended.
18. Actually there are two opinions, one from Chief Justice Weisberger and
Justices Bourcier, Goldberg and Lederberg; the other one is from Justice Flanders.
19. These are general characteristics of advisory authority. See, e.g., Opinion
to the Governor, 284 A.2d 295, 296 (R.I. 1971).
20. See infra Part II.
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played any part in the considerable public debate and media coverage. 21 Two of the briefs submitted raised questions about the propriety of engaging the advisory opinion process to deal with the
issues in the Governor's questions. 22 The other briefs were silent
on this. 23 That it was an advisory opinion that was sought to resolve a major and contentious issue deserves some attention.
This article reviews Rhode Island's advisory opinion jurisprudence as it relates to the separation of powers advisory opinion,
with particular attention devoted to questions of the propriety of
invoking the advisory opinion process in this instance. I argue
that with the separation of powers advisory opinion the justices
are continuing important changes in the legal contours of advisory
opinion jurisprudence. The changes began in 1986, after a halfcentury without significant deviation from the standards by which
the justices determined when they would render advice and when
they would refuse to do so.
The justices' duty to render advice has been set forth in the
Rhode Island Constitution since its creation in 1842: "The judges of
the supreme court shall give their written opinion upon any question of law whenever requested by the governor or by either house
of the general assembly."24 The clause is mandatory upon the justices and is unusually broad compared to the clauses of the other
25
seven states whose constitutions provide for advisory opinions.
Perhaps the clause's breadth explains why the Rhode Island jus21. See Mel A. Topf, R.I. Supreme Court: Stay Out This Time, Prov. J. Bull.,
Aug. 13, 1998, at B5.
22. See Brief of Amicus Curiaethe Honorable Paul S. Kelly, Majority Leader,
Rhode Island Senate, at 8-18, No. 97-572-M.P. [hereinafter Brief of the Majority
Leader]; Brief of Amicus CuriaeACLU, Rhode Island Affiliate, at 3-13, No. 97-572M.P. [hereinafter ACLU Briefl. But see Reply Brief of the Governor Relating to his
Request for an Advisory Opinion to the Justices Dated Nov. 20, 1997, at 4-5, No.
97-572-M.P. [hereinafter Governor's Reply Brief].
23. The Court's order inviting briefs was also silent on this. The Governor's
Reply Brief seems to express surprise that the issue came up at all in other briefs.
See Governor's Reply Brief, supra note 22, at 4 ("[Tlhis Court did not appear to
seek briefing on the propriety of the questions.").
24. R.I. Const. art. X, § 3.
25. See Colo. Const. art. VI, § 3; Fla. Const. art. IV, § 1; Me. Const. art VI, § 3;
Mass. Const. art II, § 83; Mich. Const. art. III, § 8; N.H. Const. part 2, art. 77; S.D.
Const. art. V, § 5. Two other states provide for advisory opinions by statute: Ala.
Code § 12-2-10 (1975); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 141(a) (1974). Texts of the provisions are collected in Mel A. Topf, The Jurisprudenceof the Advisory Opinion Process in Rhode Island, 2 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 207, 254-56 (1997). On the
breadth of Rhode Island's clause, see id. at 215-16.
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tices were the last of the advisory state justices to set forth limits
on their duty to advise, beginning in 1937,26 after having given advice virtually without limit since the advisory opinion clause had
first appeared. By 1986, the justices had established a set of restrictions broadly similar to those imposed by the justices in the
27
other advisory states.
The justices' authority to impose restrictions on requests for
advice, and to refuse to give advice when requests are deficient
(i.e., because the request oversteps one or more restrictions), is
grounded in their view that "this peculiar obligation" to render advice is of "obvious repugnance" to the principle of separation of
powers. 28 The advisory opinion clause was included in the constitution "in order to enable the executive and legislative departments to more effectively discharge particular duties that are
textually committed to them by the constitution." 29 The effective
performance of constitutional duties "requires from time to time
assistance from the judges of this court upon questions of law,
assistance which the framers of the constitution contemplated as
30
being best provided through the device of the advisory opinion."
The justices, however, have the duty, "in view of the separation of
the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of government," to abstain from answering a request for advice that "does
not fall reasonably within the constitutional clause relating
thereto."3 1 Hence, the provision that advice be given on any question of law was intended to exclude advice that does not assist the
coordinate branches in the discharge of specific constitutional duties.3 2 The justices' restrictions implement this exclusion.
26. See To a Certain Member of the House of Reps. in the Gen. Assembly, 191
A. 269 (R.I. 1937). The only refusals to render advice before 1937 were Opinions of
the Judges of the Supreme Court, 4 R.I. 585 (1857) and In re Legislative Adjournment, 27 A. 324 (R.I. 1893).
27. See Topf, supra note 25, at 233-40, for a review of major restrictions on
rendering advice.
28. Opinion to the Governor, 191 A.2d 611, 614 (R.I. 1963).
29. Id. This is presumably an inference by the justices. The author could find
no evidence in the documentary record of the 1842 constitutional convention explaining why the convention adopted the advisory opinion provision, and the justices do not identify any.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id.
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In 1986, the justices began to reject this position. They began,
that is, to waive the restrictions they had developed since 1937,
rendering advice notwithstanding violations of their restrictions in
requests for advice. They have continued to do so ever since. Their
rejection has been, I believe, insufficiently explained or defined and
inconsistently applied, so that advisory opinion jurisprudence in
Rhode Island has become less coherent, less predictable and extraordinarily broad. In this article I intend to explore the relation
of the 1999 separation of powers advisory opinion to the justices'
rejection of their prior position. Part II reviews the violations of
the justices' restrictions in the governor's request for advice. Part
III analyzes the ground the justices put forth for waiving their restrictions: their unprecedented public importance exemption. I argue that the exemption is not applied consistently or clearly and I
question whether it should be applied at all. Part IV discusses the
effects of the public importance exemption on advisory opinion jurisprudence to show that the exemption tends to aggravate certain
weaknesses inherent in the advisory opinion process. Part V discusses another, perhaps the most serious, effect of the expansion of
the exemption: a corresponding contraction of public debate and
legislative process, a contraction, that is, of the political space in
which political issues may be resolved.
II.

A.

PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES

The Governor's Question 1

In the Governor's first question, on the Ethics Commission's
authority to adopt Regulation 5014, 3 the justices found two defects. First, the justices will not advise the Governor on pending
legislation, but will only advise the Governor when the Governor's
questions "concern the constitutionality of existing statutes which
require implementation by the Chief Executive." 34 Second, the jus33. For text of Question 1, see supra note 14. For text of Regulation 5014, see
supra note 13.
34. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d 55, 59 (R.I. 1999). The
justices, at least since 1965, have stated that they will advise the Governor only on
laws already enacted and the legislature only on pending legislation. See Opinion
to the House of Reps., 208 A.2d 126, 128 (R.I. 1965). In a 1959 advisory opinion to
the Governor, the justices had not yet clearly distinguished between advising the
legislature only on pending legislation and the Governor only on passed legislation. See Opinion to the Governor, 153 A.2d 168, 172 (R.I. 1959) (further stating
that "the judges of this court are ordinarily reluctant to express an opinion on the
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tices will not advise the Governor unless the question propounded
has "a bearing upon a present constitutional duty awaiting performance by the Chief Executive," as emplified by the justices' following statement to the Governor: "At the time of your request
[November 20, 1997), and indeed at the present time, Regulation
5014 has not become effective and thus does not concern any constitutional duty presently awaiting performance by Your
Excellency." 3 5
The Governor's attempts at identifying constitutional duties
awaiting performance were perfunctory and vague. His letter to
the justices said only that the presence of legislators or their appointees on public boards and commissions exercising executive
power "affects the constitutional responsibility of the Executive
branch to execute faithfully the law passed by the General Assembly,"3 6 and that "whether the regulation [50141 is constitutional is
37
a question that directly affects the performance of my duties."
The only duty the Governor referred to was his duty to make "numerous appointments to boards and commissions exercising executive powers."38 This, however, is not a constitutionally vested
duty, as the justices made clear in a 1993 advisory opinion. 3 9 The
Governor's brief simply repeated the phrase about the regulation
directly affecting performance of his duties again, without identifying any such duty.40 The Senate's brief pointed to this deficiency,
forcefully arguing that "none of the questions propounded has any
relationship to the official duties of the Governor." 4 1 The Governor, in a reply brief, was indignant but evasive: "It is difficult to
take this [the Senate's] position seriously. Never has a question
constitutionality of a statute as distinguished from a proposed act in response to
executive or legislative requests").
35. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d at 59 (citation omitted).
Regulation 5014 was to become effective July 1, 1999; the advisory opinion was
issued June 29, 1999. This restriction goes back, at least, to 1971. See Opinion to
the Governor, 284 A.2d 295, 296 (R.I. 1971) (stating that advisory opinions "in
matters unconnected to the official function of the requesting coordinate branch
would amount to inexcusable gratuitousness").
36. Letter from the Governor, supra note 14, at 1.
37. Id. at 2.
38. Id. at 1.
39. See In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d 664, 666 (R.I. 1993) (quoting In re Decision of Justices, 69 A. 555, 559 (R.I. 1908)).
40. See Governor's Reply, Brief supra note 22.
41. Brief of the Majority Leader, supra note 22 at 11. See ACLU Brief, supra
note 22, at 6-7.
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been more relevant to the official constitutional duty of the Governor of the State of Rhode Island than the separation of powers
question presently before this Court." 42 During oral argument, the
Governor's counsel was silent on this point until the Chief Justice
asked, "Should the court answer the questions?... Does the Governor have an imminent duty?" 4 3 The Governor's counsel replied
that, yes, the Governor does, and without identifying any such
44
duty left the subject and moved on.
In light of these defects, the justices usually refuse to advise,
stating: "[C]onsistent with the long established precedent of this
Court, we would ordinarily refrain from responding to Your Excellency's request."45 The justices, however, proceeded to answer
Question 1. Despite the acknowledged defects, the justices stated
that the question "is a significant constitutional issue of great public interest sufficient to transcend these infirmities. Therefore, in
deference to Your Excellency's concern, we proceed to respond to
your inquiry notwithstanding the significant procedural
deficiencies." 4 6
B.

The Governor's Questions 2 and 3

The justices turned to Questions 2 and 3 regarding whether
legislators sitting on public boards and commissions offend separation of powers doctrine. They found a deficiency in these questions
42. Governor's Reply Brief, supra note 22, at 4-5.
43. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, Nov. 10, 1998. From notes of the author
who attended.
44. See id. A further aspect of this deficiency was one the justices did not
mention: the Governor was seeking advice for a third party, the commission. See
Letter from the Governor, supra note 14, at 2 ("By letter, the Commission has
requested that I seek the advice of the Justices of the Supreme Court"). The justices have long looked askance at this. See Opinion to the Governor, 284 A.2d 295
(R.I. 1971) (Justices refusing advice since Governor sought it for East Providence
City Council, whose members have no standing to seek advice through Governor,
when advice has no relation to Governor's duties.). The ACLU's brief emphasized
this defect, noting that the "mere fact that the request is on the Governor's stationery does not change the underlying reality that the request has, in essence, emanated from the Ethics Commission." ACLU Brief, supra note 22 at 7-8.
45. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d 55, 59 (R.I. 1999).
46. Id. The justices' answer to Question 1 is that "the ethics commission lacks
the power to enact Regulation 5014, which fundamentally alters the constitutional
structure of the state.... The ethics commission is not a constitutional convention." Id. at 71-72.
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as well. 4 7 The deficiency is that answering the questions would

require fact-finding: "[Tihis Court will not issue advisory opinions
which require a direct or indirect exercise of our fact-finding
power."4 s The grounds are that the justices render advisory opinions "as individuals and not as the judicial department of state
government." 4 9 Fact-finding power inheres in the court as the judicial branch of the state government. The judges in their individual capacities "therefore lack the power to issue advisory opinions
which implicate fact-finding."50
The fact-finding that would be required to answer Questions 2
and 3, the justices stated, is to determine which of the public
boards and commissions were executive in nature: the "classification of boards as executive or otherwise requires fact-intensive investigation of the nature, purpose, membership, and operation of
each board and commission."5 1 Further, "even determining the
number of boards to which our advisory opinion would apply would
require the exercise of fact-finding powers." 52 The justices therefore declined to answer Questions 2 and 3.
The justices' explanation seems unlikely. Why is it necessary
to identify all the boards that are executive, in order to respond to
the general question of whether legislators sitting on executive
boards offends the state constitution's separation of powers provision? The justices did not explain. They said only that some
boards are executive, some not, some combine executive with legislative or judicial functions and some combine all three. 53 Neither
did they explain the necessity of ascertaining how many there
were. Questions 2 and 3 would seem to apply whether legislators
serve on 75, 140 or just one board. Also, Justice Flanders, in his
separate opinion, noted the inconsistency of the majority's dire
(and factual) prediction of the many "legal deaths" of executive
47. See id. at 72-73. For text of Questions 2 and 3, see supra note 14.
48. Id. at 72. The justices have applied this restriction at least since 1963. See
Opinion to the Governor, 191 A.2d 611, 614 (R.I. 1963).
49. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d at 72 (quoting Opinion to
the Governor, 191 A.2d at 614).

50. Id.
51. Id. at 73.
52. Id. The justices noted the varying numbers of boards and commissions in
the brief submitted, which they say ranges from 75 to 140. See id. at 73. But see
id. at 73 (According to Senate brief, its members serve on 140 boards and commis-

sions but appoint others to 166.).
53. See id. at 73.
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boards and commissions with sitting legislators or their appointees
54
should Regulation 5014 go into effect.
Having established that Questions 2 and 3 were defective
55
since they require fact-finding, the justices refused to answer.
Why did they not waive the defects on public importance grounds,
as they waived the present-duty restriction in answering Question
1?56 They did not say. They simply waived the one and not the
others without explanation or comment.
Did the justices refrain from answering Questions 2 and 3?
They said they "must respectfully decline to address Your Excellency's questions [2 and 31."57 But earlier in the advisory opinion
they offered, at some length, their opinion on the subject of the constitutionality of legislators sitting and appointing others to sit on
boards and commissions. They looked to the history of Rhode Island's fundamental law and found no limits, by separation of powers principles or otherwise, on the legislature's power of
appointments. 58 The Royal Charter of 1663 "delegated virtually
unlimited power to govern to the General Assembly," including the
power "to appoint persons, including from its own membership" to
bodies addressing colonial, administrative and governmental
needs, including legislative and judicial bodies. 59 For 170 years,
"the General Assembly exercised legislative power, judicial power,
and unlimited power of appointment."60 The Governor, a member
of the legislature, had limited executive capacity. 6 1 The Rhode Island Constitution made little change in this power structure. The
54. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d at 78 (Flanders, J.
dissenting). Earlier in his opinion Justice Flanders was emphatic about the advisory opinion provision being mandatory upon the justices: "[Tihis constitutional
command is unequivocal, peremptory, and without qualification." He did not reconcile this with his agreement that advisory opinion requests requiring fact-finding may be refused. Id. at 74. But see id. at 62 (indicating "Regulation 5014, if
authorized by our Constitution, would invalidate scores of other boards and commissions that currently exist and perform a number of important and sometimes
vital functions").
55. See id. at 72.
56. See In re Advisory Opinion, 732 A.2d at 72. The justices did not address
the question of whether the Governor has a present constitutional duty requiring
performance for which answers to Questions 2 and 3 are needed.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 63-65.
59. Id. at 63.
60. Id.
61. See id.
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1842 constitution that replaced the Charter specifically provided
that the now constitution-based General Assembly retained all
powers it exercised to that point, unless otherwise prohibited by
the constitution.6 2 The 1986 constitution retained the reserved
powers of the General Assembly. 63 An amendment was proposed
at the 1986 constitutional convention to curb the appointive powers of the General Assembly, but it failed to pass.6 The justices
further noted the major differences between treatment of executive
power in the United States Constitution and the Rhode Island
Constitution. The framers of the latter included no specific appointments clause and they "deliberately fragmented and distributed the executive power among four elected general officers." 65
Regarding separation of powers, "it is the Rhode Island Constitution that we are expounding, not the Constitution of the United
States or the constitutions of our sister states which may vary
widely from our own." 66 This point apparently was intended to

counter arguments by the Governor that the United States and
most state constitutions prohibit legislators and their appointees
on executive boards and commissions as violations of separation of
powers.6 7 Further, the justices asserted that the "sole and proper
procedure" for banning legislators from serving on or appointing
others to executive boards and commissions was by constitutional
amendment.6 8 This is consistent with the view that present practice, whereby legislators freely sit and appoint others to sit on
boards and commissions, is constitutionally sound, requiring an
amendment to change the practice.
The justices also appear to have answered a question not
asked. The Governor's letter does not specifically inquire about the
constitutionality of Regulation 5014. They nonetheless identified
one constitutional defect, though the defect is related neither to the
commission's authority nor to separation of powers. The justices
found that the regulation has a "self-executing presumption of universal conflict of interest and conclusive guilt based on status as a
62.

See R.I. Const. of 1842, art. IV, § 10; In re Advisory Opinion, 732 A.2d at

63-64.
63.
64.

See R.I. Const. art. VI, § 10; In re Advisory Opinion, 732 A.2d at 63-64.
See In re Advisory Opinion, 732 A.2d at 65.

65. Id.
,66. Id. at 73.
67. See, e.g., Governor's Reply Brief, supra note 22, at 14-29.
68. In re Advisory Opinion, 732 A.2d at 72.
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legislator,"6 9 in violation of "the ancient and venerable principle of
justice that is firmly embedded in our state's jurisprudence," that a
70
person is presumed innocent until proven otherwise.
III.

THE

PUBLIC IMPORTANCE ExEMP'ION

In the separation of powers advisory opinion, the justices invoked the public importance exemption to answer one defective
question. They ignored the exemption when they declined to answer the other two questions. This has been fairly typical of the
invocations of the public importance exemption, which have been
without sufficient clarity, definition or predictability.
Since developing their restrictions beginning in 1937, 7 1 the
justices adhered to them with few exceptions until 1986. In the
near half-century from 1937 through 1985 the justices received
ninety-nine advisory opinion requests. They refused, in all or in
part, thirty requests for advice, nearly all for failing to comply with
one or more restrictions. During these years, the justices waived
their restrictions only twice. 7 2 This changed dramatically in 1986.
In the fourteen years from 1986 through 1999, the justices waived
their restrictions for six advisory opinion requests, out of a total of
nineteen requests.7 3 During this time, before their refusal to answer the Governor's Questions 2 and 3, they refused to advise only
once. 74
69. Id. at 66.
70. Id.
71. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
72. See Opinion to the Governor, 170 A.2d 908 (R.I. 1961) (waiving restriction
against rendering advice when request does not specify particular provision of the
constitution implicated); In re Opinion to the House of Reps., 5 A.2d 455 (R.I. 1939)
(waiving restriction against rendering advice in case pending in court). In 1970,
the justices said they would have rendered advice to the Senate despite restriction
against doing so, when requesting house had adjourned sine die, except that the
question propounded would have been moot by the time the justices could have
answered it. See Opinion to the Senate, 271 A.2d 810 (R.I. 1970).
73. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1999); In re
Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 666 A.2d 813 (R.I. 1995); In re Advisory from
the Governor, 633 A.2d 664 (R.I. 1993); In re Advisory Opinion to the House of
Reps., 576 A.2d 1371 (R.I. 1990); In re Advisory Opinion, 507 A.2d 1316 (R.I. 1986);
In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 504 A.2d 456 (R.I. 1986).
74. See To the Honorable Senate, 610 A.2d 131 (R.I. 1992).
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The rationale for all six waivers made since 1986 is the same,
and it is unprecedented: public importance. 7 5 In the first of the six
waivers the justices advised on whether the conflict of interest
statute required a state-appointed official, who was a member of a
state agency, to resign from the agency, when a business in which
the official had an interest came before the agency, or whether the
official need only recuse himself. The same issue was being litigated before the Rhode Island Conflict of Interest Commission.
One of the justices' restrictions is refusal to advise if the question
is involved in pending litigation, either judicially or administratively. 76 The issue, however, pointed to a threat to the Governor's

ability to persuade qualified people to assume public office. Hence,
"W[the public interest," the justices stated, "requires us to
77
respond."
In this and the next two advisory opinions applying the public
importance exemption, the justices seem to have suggested that it
was to be invoked only with deliberateness and in exceptional circumstances. In the first opinion applying the exemption, the justices referred to the "extreme conditions" that would justify such
an exemption from their restrictions. 78 The second opinion applying the exemption responded to a question concerning the removal
of the Chief Justice, jointly propounded by the Governor and both
75. The justices applied a somewhat similar rationale once before 1986. See
In re Legislative Adjournment, 27 A. 324, 325-26 (R.I. 1893) (Justices need not
"take notice" of a House resolution in which the House propounded a question,
since the House was not in session, the Governor having prorogued the General
Assembly. Justices nevertheless render advice owing to "[t]he gravity of the situation" and "the importance of the principles and rights involved," which "are a sufficient warrant."). In Opinion to the Senate, 271 A.2d 810 (R.I. 1970), the justices
mentioned the rationale but did not apply it. See id. (noting that the Justices
would be willing to advise, owing to "the importance of the issues raised," despite
Senate having adjourned sine die, except that the question would be moot by the
time the justices answered it).
76. See, e.g., Opinion to the House of Reps., 43 A.2d 944 (R.I. 1984) (refusing
advice, owing to pending litigation in Superior Court); In re Advisory Opinion to
the Governor, 492 A.2d 134 (R.I. 1985) (refusing to advise owing to pending litigation in administrative proceeding).
77. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 504 A.2d 456, 459 (R.I. 1986) (advising that recusal is sufficient) (footnote omitted).
78. Id. at 458-59 (citing Opinion to the House of Reps., 149 A.2d 343, 345 (R.I.
1959) (Justices refuse to advise owing to pending litigation "in the absence of more
extreme conditions than now appear to require the justices to give an advisory
opinion on a question of law which is involved materially in a pending ... case.").
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houses of the General Assembly.7 9 The justices stated that the request for advice violated the justices' restrictions against joint requests, against requests where the Governor lacks a present
constitutional duty awaiting performance and against requests
made absent a formal resolution in either house requesting the advice.8 0 Nevertheless, the justices issued the opinion, citing "the
profoundly important substantive issues."8 ' They stressed, however, that they "shall not consider this action as a precedent indicating that in the future we shall render an advisory opinion when
82
the requesting petition is improperly before this court."
In the third advisory opinion applying the exemption, the justices waived their pending litigation restriction, citing the "public
importance of the question currently propounded."8 3 They cited
the first opinion in which they applied the exemption, "where this
court noted that, despite our established practice of refraining
from rendering advisory opinions when the questions propounded
are involved in litigation, there are extreme circumstances involv4
ing the public interest in which we shall respond."
Despite the careful assertions about extreme conditions and
not creating precedent in these three earlier advisory opinions, the
justices left the exemption open-ended, if not arbitrary. They did
not address what defined extreme conditions. They did not address at all when the exemption may be applied and when it may
not. They set no standards for what constitutes public importance
sufficient to warrant application of the exemption. They did not explain why they set aside an earlier standard that specifically rejected a public importance exemption, at least for questions that
might reach the Supreme Court through certification by the Attorney General. In a 1959 advisory opinion to the Governor, the justices refused to advise owing to pending litigation. They asserted
that if the Governor deems his questions to be "of such pressing
79. See In re Advisory Opinion, 507 A.2d 1316 (R.I. 1986).
80. See id. at 1318-19.
81. Id. at 1319.
82. Id.
83. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Reps., 576 A.2d 1371, 1372 (R.I.
1990) (This case addressed the issue of whether the Governor could unilaterally
withhold from distribution funds which the legislature designated as state aid to
cities and towns. The justices answered in the negative.).
84. Id. (citing In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 504 A.2d 456, 458 (R.I.
1986)).
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public interest and importance that they should be decided without
the necessity of awaiting the outcome of the... litigation," then he
could ask the Attorney General to certify the question to the
justices.8 5
The imprecisely defined expansion of the public importance exemption was reflected in one justice's "dissent"8 6 in the third advisory opinion applying the exemption. The justice noted that the
question from the House "[had] nothing to do with . . .pending
legislation," but was actually about the duty of the Governor under
passed legislation, and the Governor not only had sought no advice
but had objected to the House's request.8 7 In addition, he questioned the propriety of the issuance of an advisory opinion while a
similar question was involved in pending litigation.8 8 The justice
emphasized that in the second exempted opinion the justices made
89
clear that the exemption should not be construed as precedent.
The dissent simply pointed out deficiencies in the request for advice and expressed concern about the waiver. It identified no standard or definitions by which his view should prevail over that of
the majority.
In the three later exempting advisory opinions, the justices'
attitude toward the exemption became less restrained and more
expansive. In the first of these three (the fourth exempted opinion), the justices applied the exemption, but this time stated no
warnings about precedents, 90 in contrast to the second exempted
opinion. In the fourth opinion, the justices rendered advice to the
Governor despite finding that the Governor had no present constitutional duty awaiting performance for which the advice was
needed. 9 1 The justices applied the public importance exemption to
this defect using language nearly identical to that in the second
exempted opinion: "In spite of the procedural deficiency ingrained
in this request, we shall exercise our discretion and waive the de85. Opinion to the Governor, 149 A.2d 341 (R.I. 1959) (citing R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 9-24-27 (1956)).
86. Topf, supra note 25, at 248. Strictly speaking there can be no dissents to
advisory opinions which represent only the opinions of individual justices and not
of the court. "Dissent" is a misnomer for an opinion of a justice whose opinion
differs from an opinion adopted by the majority.
87. Opinion to the House of Reps., 576 A.2d at 1376.
88. See id.
89. See id. (citing In re Advisory Opinion, 507 A.2d 1316, 1319 (R.I. 1986)).
90. See In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d 664 (R.I. 1993).
91. See id. at 667.
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fect ...because this is an instance in which the public and constitutional importance is paramount."9 2 This time, however, the
justices were silent, as they would remain thereafter, about
whether or not they should be interpreted as establishing
precedent.
This advisory opinion was one of several affecting the Rhode
Island Ethics Commission.9 3 The Governor's request for advice
94
challenged the commission's new "revolving door" regulations.
The challenge was unsuccessful. The justices upheld the authority
of the commission to make the regulations. 95 The Governor based
his request on his need for advice pursuant to his duty to appoint
92. Id. (citation omitted). See also In re Advisory Opinion, 507 A.2d at 131920 (R.I. 1986) (indicating that "[iln spite of procedural deficiencies inherent within
the petition before us... we shall exercise our discretion and waive the defects").
93. The Ethics Commission has been the object of unusual attention in advisory opinions. Indeed, since the commission's creation in 1986, the advisory opinion process has been the chief means of interpreting its powers. Two of the six
opinions applying the public interest exemption involved commission powers, the
fourth on revolving door rules and the sixth on separation of powers. (Another
exempting opinion, the first one issued, came out of a challenge to a ruling by the
Ethics Commission's predecessor, the Conflict of Interest Commission.) Another
advisory opinion on the Ethics Commission (not involving a public interest exemption) found that the constitution gave the commission power to enact ethics laws.
See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 612 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1992). Here the Governor's request for advice seems defective in several respects, but the justices are
silent on this and proceed to advise without comment on the request's propriety.
The Governor sought the advice so that he could "(1) promote, oversee and participate in an orderly system of ethics reform; (2) fulfill my responsibilities to appoint
qualified public officials with the knowledge and ability to inform them of the ethical rules to which they will be bound; and (3) discharge my duty under Article IX,
§ 3 of the Rhode Island Constitution to see that the laws are faithfully executed."
See Letter from Governor Bruce Sundlun to the Justices of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court 2 (Nov. 5, 1991). Ethics reform is not an enumerated executive
power; the Governor specifies no law awaiting execution; and appointment powers
are not constitutionally vested, the justices have ruled. See In re Advisory Opinion
to the Governor, 504 A.2d 456 (R.I. 1986).
94. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-14-5(n), (o) (1956) (Reenactment 1997). See also
R.I. Ethics Commission Advisory No. 13, The Code of Ethics as it Affects Legislators and Their Related Financial Interests (1992) (publicizing the Commission's
views and interpretations of the Code of Ethics regarding propriety of legislators in
outside ventures); R.I. Ethics Commission Advisory Opinion No. 92-30 (1992) (determining whether a legislator's employment is restrictive on her ability to participate and to vote on certain items coming before the general assembly). See
generally Katherine Gregg, Sundlun Takes Aim at Parts of Ethics Law, Prov. J.
Bull., Apr. 17, 1993, at Al (interviewing the Governor and other officials involved
with the ethics opinion challenge).
95. See In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d 664, 678 (R.I. 1993).
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qualified people to certain government positions, but the justices
found that "no power of appointment [was] vested in the governor,
save to fill vacancies temporarily existing.... [Olur own constitu96
tion [did] not make appointment to office an executive function."
Hence, "it [was] evident that the Governor [had] no present constitutional duty awaiting performance." 97 The brief of the Ethics
Commission, besides noting this defect, pointed to two others. One
was that advising in this case required fact-finding by the justices;
specifically, they would need to make "an ad hoc evaluation of each
and every appointment... and each determination would involve
various findings of fact."9 8 The other was that the question was
"vague in form."9 9 The justices applied the public importance exemption in this way: by ignoring the arguments on fact-finding and
vagueness altogether. As to the Governor's duty, they made clear
there was none: "the Governor has no present constitutional duty
awaiting performance." 10 0 Then, the justices immediately proceeded to waive the defect. The only elucidation of the exemption
was a citation without comment to the second exempted opinion. 10 1
The justices did not note that this opinion stressed that their exemption was not to be construed as a precedent, "indicating that in
the future we shall render an advisory opinion when the requesting petition is improperly before this court or procedurally
10 2
defective."
The fifth exempting advisory opinion increased the ambiguity
about application of the exemption. The Governor sought an opinion on whether the state was constitutionally required to provide
free counsel to indigent defendants even when the trial judge determined that no incarceration would be imposed.' 0 3 The Gover96. Id. at 666 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Decision of Justices, 69 A. 555,
559 (R.I. 1908)). See also R.I. Const. art V, § 4; R.I. Const. art IX, § 5 (each dictating that the authority to fill vacancies of government offices generally lies within
the power of the general assembly).
97. In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d at 667.
98. Brief and Appendix of Amicus Curiae: R.I. Ethics Commission, at 12 No.
97-572-M.P.; In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d 664 (R.I. 1993).
99. Id. The justices have said they will decline to respond to questions insufficiently specific or clear as to the thrust of the inquiry. See Advisory Opinion to the
Governor, 289 A.2d 430 (R.I. 1972).
100. In re Advisory Opinion from the Governor, 633 A.2d at 667.
101. See id. at 667 (citing In re Advisory Opinion, 507 A.2d 1316, 1319-20 (R.I.
1986)).
102. In re Advisory Opinion, 507 A.2d at 1319-20.
103. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 666 A.2d 813 (R.I. 1995).
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nor claimed he needed the opinion in order to provide for sufficient
funding in the budget which he was constitutionally obliged to prepare and send to the General Assembly. 10 4 The question propounded, however, was not actually about the Governor's
budgetary duties. One justice in a separate opinion made the
point: "The Governor's argument [on his need for advice] . . .is
unconvincing. The question propounded is simply whether the
state has an obligation to provide legal representation to indigent
misdemeanor defendants. The question, therefore, does not bear
upon the Governor's duty to present a balanced budget to the General Assembly." 10 5 Hence, "this case is a definitive textbook instance in which the Governor's question is not properly the subject
of an advisory opinion."' 0 6 The majority's opinion did state that
the justices "will generally refrain from advising the Governor on
issues" not bearing on a present constitutional duty awaiting performance. 10 7 But then they seemed to have presented it both
ways. Does the Governor have such a duty? Their opinion was
simply that "Your Excellency has presented legitimate concerns
that impede your ability to prepare a budget absent clarification of
the requirements imposed by article I, section 10."108 Since article
I, section 10 specified no duty of the Governor, the justices would
seem to have opened up the advisory process to virtually every
item in the state budget for both the Governor and the legislature.
The justices quickly attempted to close it again: "Although we are
responding to your request for advice in this instance, we would
not consider that every issue affecting the state budgetary duties of
the Governor or of the General Assembly would be a proper subject
for such an opinion." 10 9 The justices did not specify how the Governor and legislature were to know which issues would be proper and
which would not. Then, without explanation, they referred to the
public interest exemption, curiously relegating it to a footnote:
"This Court has exercised its discretion to issue advisory opinions
104. See id. at 815. See also R.I. Const. art. IX, § 15 (articulating that it is the
governor's duty to submit a budget).
105. In re Advisory Opinion, 666 A.2d at 819 (Murray, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 818 (Murray, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 814-15.
108. Id. at 815. See also R.I. Const. art. I, § 10 (providing for the rights of the
accused, which include the right "to have the assistance of counsel in their

defense").
109.

In re Advisory Opinion, 666 A.2d at 815.
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even on questions arguably improperly before the court, but of
great public importance." 1 10 Its relevance to the propriety of the
request for advice is not specified or clear. Perhaps it is the standard by which the justices will decide when budget-related questions will be answered and when not. The justices do not say.
With the fifth exempting advisory opinion, the public importance exemption has evolved in two ways. It now trumps the justices' restrictions developed since 1937. And it has become
somewhat free-wheeling and expansive, with little definition or
clarity as to what constitutes public importance or what warrants
applying the exemption to one defective request for advice but not
to another. There is a diminished likelihood that anyone can reasonably predict what a proper request for advice is, or determine
why some questions failing to fall within the justices' restrictions
are rejected for that reason and why some are not. In short, the
public interest exemption has made it increasingly difficult to determine the scope of the justices' advisory jurisdiction.
The exemption's effects are intensified by the striking frequency with which it has been applied. Compare its use in the
other advisory states. During this period, 1986-1999, the justices
in each of the other nine advisory opinion states applied a public
importance exemption to defective requests for advice either rarely
or not at all. Justices in seven of these states applied no such exemption during this time. Justices in two states did. 1 1' The Alabama justices applied the exemption three times, while refusing
advice twelve times out of a total of thirty-nine requests for advice
in this period. 1 12 The Massachusetts justices applied the exemption once, while refusing to advise eight times out of a total of
110. Id. at 815 n.1. In their footnote, the Justices cite the first, second and
fourth of the exempted opinions, though not the third.
111. It is possible that advisory justices may ignore defects in the requests for
advice and answer deficient questions on public importance grounds, without calling attention to their doing so. My concern here, however, is with the explicit application of the public importance exemption.
112. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 109 (Ala. 1993) (Despite pending litigation, question propounded "is one of great public interest."); Opinion of
the Justices, 599 So. 2d 1166, 1167 (Ala. 1992) (Despite legislature not in session
and no pending legislation, "matters of great public concern are involved requiring
immediate resolution."); Opinion of the Justices, 558 So. 2d 390, 391 (Ala. 1989)
(Despite pending litigation, Governor's request "involves questions vitally important to the people of the State of Alabama.").
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twenty-nine requests for advice. 1 13 From 1986 through 1999, the
justices of the nine advisory opinion states, other than Rhode Island, responded to a total of 134 advisory opinion requests and applied a public importance exemption a total of four times. 114 The
justices in Rhode Island, responding to nineteen requests, applied
the exemption six times.
IV.

THE PUBLIC IMPORTANCE EXEMPTION:
JURISPRUDENTIAL ISSUES

The uncertainty that the public importance exemption has
lent to advisory opinion jurisprudence in Rhode Island raises several problems in areas that themselves have long troubled the advisory opinion process: separation of powers, problematic effects on
private rights and the purportedly non-precedential nature of advisory opinions.
A.

Separation of Powers

The justices' observation about the "repugnance" of the advisory opinion process to the principle of separation of powers'1 5
points to what is perhaps the most significant problem of expanding the public interest exemption, effectively expanding occasions for issuing advisory opinions. This is the most formidable
challenge to advisory opinions, one that has shadowed them from
the start: separation of powers doctrine. The United States
Supreme Court's rejection of advisory opinions in 1793 was
1 16
grounded then and is still mainly grounded in that doctrine.
113. See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 493 N.E.2d 859, 863 (Mass.
1986) (Despite question being on constitutionality of existing statutes, advice was
necessary to avoid needlessly expending considerable time, effort and public funds
should statutes be found unconstitutional later.).
114. In a recent advisory opinion the Massachusetts justices seemed to have
expressed skepticism about a public importance exemption. See Answer of the
Justices to the Acting Governor, 686 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Mass. 1997) ("If there is no
present duty, no solemn occasion exists and the Justices are constitutionally constrained from rendering an advisory opinion regardless of the importance of the
particular question.") (citing Answer of the Justices, 547 N.E.2d 17 (Mass. 1989)).
115. Opinion to the Governor, 191 A.2d 611, 614 (R.I. 1963); see supra note 28
and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Stewart Jay, Most Humble Servants: The Advisory Role of Early
Judges 113-48 (1997) (discussing the United States Supreme Court's 1793 rejection of President Washington's request for advice); see also, e.g., Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) ("[Ihe rule against advisory opinions implements the separation of powers prescribed by the Constitution.") (citations omitted).
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Exemplifying many state supreme courts' strong views on this was
the Ohio Supreme Court's overturning of an advisory opinion statute in 1882, ruling that for the court to advise the legislature
would "be an unwarranted interference.., dangerous in its tendency." 117 In those states where advisory authority is provided by
the constitution, the justices still must develop standards to balance advisory duties with separation of powers, as did the Rhode
Island justices. 118 An aggravating problem here is the tendency of
one political branch to use the advisory process against the other,
or at least to use the supreme court to supervise a coordinate
branch. 1 19 The 1999 separation of powers advisory opinion may
plausibly be viewed as an attempt by the Governor to limit the constitutional plenary powers of the legislature. The point here is
that advisory opinion processes, which trouble separation of powers doctrine under any circumstances, trouble it all the more with
a public interest exemption that, by trumping virtually any restriction ever placed on advisory opinion requests, permits the justices
to broaden the scope of the advisory process without limits.
B.

ProblematicEffects on Private Rights

The public importance exemption similarly aggravates a longnoted problem with the advisory process: no one "can tell, when a
question is proposed, how far the decision may affect private
rights."120 Further, "[the justices] may give such an opinion as
they may be called upon to revise in their judicial capacity on a
question of private rights." 12 1 In addition, though advisory justices
have in more recent years allowed briefs and arguments, there is
117. State v. Baughman, 38 Ohio St. 455, 459 (1882). For a review of rulings
overturning advisory opinion statutes, see Topf, supra note 25, at 230 & n.149.
118. See, e.g., Answer of the Justices to the Council, 291 N.E.2d 598, 600,
(Mass. 1973) (The Massachusetts advisory opinion provision "must be strictly observed in order to preserve the fundamental principle of the separation of the judicial from the executive and the legislative branches of government.") (citation
omitted).
119. See Robert H. Kennedy, Advisory Opinions: Cautions About Non-Judicial
Undertakings, 23 U. Rich. L. Rev. 173, 182 (1989).
120. Official Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the State Convention

688 (Mass. 1853). The Massachusetts Convention of 1853 debated a proposal to
remove the advisory opinion provision, which carried at the convention, but failed
at the ballot. See Albert R. Ellingwood, Departmental Cooperation in State Government 36-39 (1918).
121. Official Report, supra note 120, at 688.
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no sure way to identify in advance those who may be affected by an
opinion. At any rate, decisions as to who may submit briefs, and
whether briefs may be submitted at all, remains at the discretion
of the justices. 122 Another problem here is that, without private
parties with a direct stake in the outcome, the justices may be imperfectly briefed and given "but an imperfect knowledge of the
facts." 123 It may be difficult "to find advocates with sufficient stake
in the matter to effectively represent opposing points of view," especially when the justices, apprehensive about due process, attempt to restrict opinions to general public issues. 12 4 If there are
no briefs or arguments, the justices "can arrive at a conclusion only
by consulting among themselves and comparing their several
" 25
views on the matter.
Further, since advisory proceedings are prospective, they
"might foreclose issues on which interested parties in future litigation would not have had full opportunity to be heard."126 There is
also the risk of the justices being "insensibly biased" in later litigated proceedings by their earlier advisory opinions, simply owing
to pride of first conviction and the additional need to change al122. See Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Advisory Opinions:A Wise Changefor Louisiana and Its Judiciary?,38 Loy. L. Rev. 329, 349 (1992), and Kennedy, supra note
119, at 192, for a discussion on problems of identifying and notifying parties who
may have an interest in an advisory opinion proceeding.
123. Recent Cases, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 650, 655 (1913).
124. Calogero, supra note 122, at 349. In a letter, Massachusetts Chief Justice
Paul J. Liacos stated, "When we receive a request we publish an announcement
and solicit briefs from interested parties. The briefing sometimes is not so effective or as well-focused as that which follows thorough examination of the issues
through the trial processes." Letter from Paul J. Liacos, Massachusetts Chief Justice, to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Louisiana Chief Justice (May 17, 1991) (on file with
author).
125. F.R. Aumann, The Supreme Court and the Advisory Opinion, 4 Ohio St. L.
Rev. 21, 47 (1937) (arguing that "[tihis does not seem to be a very satisfactory
arrangement").
126. Charles M. Carberry, Comment, The State Advisory Opinion in Perspective, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 81, 101 (1975). These are the oldest and most persistent
objections to rendering advisory opinions by the advisory justices themselves. See,
e.g., Opinion of the Court, 62 N.H. 704 (1816) (refusing to advise as question may
affect private rights in litigation). This is, so far as I can determine, the earliest
reported instance of advisory justices refusing to render advice. See also Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1820, Report of the Judiciary Committee 72
(arguing for proposal to remove advisory opinion provision: "The question proposed
by the legislature or by the Governor and Council to the Judges may deeply affect
private rights and interests.").
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ready defined and published views. 127 The Rhode Island justices
themselves expressed this concern to members of the Rhode Island
Constitutional Convention of 1986: "Once an advisory opinion is
issued, it becomes very difficult to reconsider an issue and decide it
1 28
differently, in light of an actual factual situation."
C. Advisory Opinions as PurportedlyNon-Binding
These problems would seem to be effectively neutralized by
another characteristic of advisory opinions. They are purportedly
just advice, non-binding and without precedential weight. As Justice Flanders put it in his minority opinion on the separation of
powers questions, "advisory opinions have no precedential value in
the sense of stare decisis; that is, they lack the potentially controlling impact that decisions in previously litigated cases and controversies have upon later decided cases involving the same or similar
factual situations." 129 The Rhode Island justices have emphatically put forth their advisory opinions as products of non-judicial
action by judges sitting in a non-judicial capacity, and as such
their advice is neither binding nor precedential. The justices' earliest general statement about advisory opinions was that their advice "is not a decision of this court; and... can have no weight as a
precedent."1 30 A century later, in 1959, the justices repeated
127. See Ellingwood, supra note 120, at 254-55. See also Preston W. Edsall,
The Advisory Opinion in North Carolina,27 N.C. L. Rev. 297, 333 (1949) (quoting
from the Notes section of the Harvard Law Review, which stated:
Admitting that it [an advisory opinion] is purely advisory, it is an official
act and can hardly fail to be prejudicial to parties adversely interested,
and to influence the officials of lower tribunals as well as to bias the subsequent opinions of the judges themselves if the question comes up for
actual decision.
Notes, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 50 (1897)); C. Dallas Sands, Government by Judiciary-Advisory Opinions in Alabama, 4 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1951):
It would seem natural to anticipate that because of the operation of psychological factors, advisory opinions would possess a high normative quality. From the standpoint of the justices themselves, it is normal for a
person to cling to an opinion once reached until a strong showing against
it is made.
128. Rhode Island Constitutional Convention of 1986, Report of the Judicial
Selection and Discipline Committee Minutes, May 21, 1986.
129. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d 55, 86 n.17 (R.I. 1999)
(citations omitted).
130. G. & D. Taylor & Co. v. R.G. & J.T. Place, 4 R.I. 324, 362 (1856).
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this,13 1 stating that "[wie are aware of no instance in which this
court has ever adopted a contrary view." 132 Another 1959 advisory
opinion developed the rationale:
It may be helpful to point out that the constitution by its express language imposes a mandatory duty on the judges of
the supreme court to answer such questions. Section 2 [the
advisory opinion clause] does not impose that duty on the
supreme court as a judicial department of the state government. Opinions of the justices ...

133
are merely advisory.

This means, as the justices stated elsewhere, that an advisory
opinion
is in no sense a decision of the supreme court.... [Tihe judges
do not speak ex cathedra, from the chair of judgment, but
only as consulters ....

However sound the opinion may be, it

carries no mandate.34 For this reason it is not an exercise of
our judicial power. 1

This would seem to mitigate the effects of an expanding use of the
public interest exemption and consequent expansion of advisory
opinions, since it apparently neutralizes problems relating to separation of powers and private rights.
However, almost no one believes it. Few besides advisory justices make claims that advisory opinions are non-binding. Advisory opinions in Rhode Island, and elsewhere, have always been
treated as precedential by nearly everyone else. Requesting authorities rarely fail to act as if bound by the advice. One observer
commented that it would be "absurdly naive" to believe that the
advice should be taken as anything but a reliable prediction of how
the court will hold if the same question came before it later in litigation. 13 5 The Delaware justices are straightforward about it.
They say their advisory opinions are "binding on no one," but are
still "what one would expect the Justices to say if the issue had
136
been presented to them in litigation."
131. See Opinion to the Governor, 149 A.2d 341, 342 (R.I. 1959) ("[Aln advisory
opinion would not constitute a decision of this court, .. and would have no binding

effect.").
132. Id.
133. Opinion to the Governor, 153 A.2d 168, 170-71 (R.I. 1959).
134. Opinion to the Governor, 174 A.2d 553, 554 (R.I. 1961).
135. Sands, supra note 127, at 25.
136. Opinion of the Justices, 413 A.2d 1245, 1248 (Del. 1980).
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It is likely that it was always like this. Maine's Chief Justice
noted in 1908 that advisory opinions are "often cited as judicial
authority and the people are prone to regard them as adjudications
to be adhered to despite all arguments to the contrary."13 7 The
media tend not to make the distinction, regularly referring to an
advisory opinion proceeding as a "case" which the "supreme court"
will "decide." 138 The justices themselves rely on advisory opinions
in litigated cases, often extensively, in a manner indistinguishable
from their reliance on litigated cases. 139
This may put a lower court in an awkward position if a proceeding is begun there while the justices are preparing an advisory
opinion on an issue that may bear on the proceeding. Shortly
before the justices issued the 1999 separation of powers advisory
opinion, a superior court judge granted the Governor a preliminary
injunction blocking the Rhode Island Lottery Commission's approval to increase the number of video slot machines at a dog racing track and a jai alai fronton, both private commercial
enterprises. The Governor argued that the Lottery Commission violated the state constitution's separation of powers provision in
that it was an executive body with legislators not only sitting on it,
but also comprising six of its nine members. At that point in time
the justices were preparing the separation of powers advisory opinion, involving issues being argued in the litigated case and affecting rights of private parties. In an instance of the tail wagging the
dog, the judge in the litigated case decided to hold off proceedings
until the purportedly non-binding advisory opinion was issued.
One reason the judge issued the preliminary injunction is that he
wanted to "hold matters approximately in the status quo" in light
137. Lucilius A. Emery, Advisory Opinions from Justices, 2 Me. L. Rev. 1, 2
(1908).
138. See, e.g., Tom Mooney, Justices Refuse to Ban Legislators from State
Boards, Prov. J. Bull., June 30, 1999, at Al (referring to the separation of powers
advisory opinion as a "decision"); Tom Mooney, Court Close to Ruling on 'Power'
Case, Prov. J. Bull., June 18, 1999, at B1.
139. See, e.g., Davis v. Hawksley, 379 A.2d 922, 923 (R.I. 1977) (citing In re
Opinion to the Governor, 116 A.2d 474, 475 (R.I. 1955), as sole support of court's
interpretation of R.I. Const. art. IX, § 6); State v. Garnetto, 63 A.2d 777, 779 (R.I.
1949) (citing Opinion of the Justices, 3 R.I. 299 (1853), to support that it is "unquestionably ...the established law ...that the [legislaturel cannot under our
constitution rightfully exercise judicial power"). See also Terrance A. Smiljanich,
Comment, Advisory Opinions in Florida:An Experiment in IntergovernmentalCooperation, 24 U. Fla. L. Rev. 328, 332 (1972) (studying all Florida advisory opinions
to 1971 and finding that the majority were cited in later cases as authority).
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of the "pendency of the request by the Governor for an advisory
opinion." 140 The judge was "looking to the Supreme Court for ultimate guidance," so he ordered a status conference "on the day following the issuance by the Supreme Court of an advisory opinion
..for the purpose, basically in seeing what the advisory opinion
S.. has said and what steps, if any, should be taken as a result
thereof."14 1 The Lottery Commission, however, appealed the
judge's preliminary injunction to the Supreme Court and the

Supreme Court scheduled arguments on

it.142

The Supreme Court

hearing was held on June 30, the day after the justices had issued
the separation of powers advisory opinion. The inevitable awkwardness and complications were apparent. The attorney representing the Lottery Commission said that the superior court judge
constantly referred to the expected advisory opinion. 143 When the
Chief Justice said that the justices did not answer the Governor's
Questions 2 and 3, the attorney replied that the justices in fact did
use "strong language" regarding the constitutionality of legislators
serving on and appointing others to executive boards and commissions.14 4 When the judge later ruled that the ban be lifted, he said
he had "read and reread" the advisory opinion, and he "inescapably" concluded that "it would be intellectually and legally wrong"
to keep the ban in force since the justices "inferentially" answered
Question 2.145 The judge issued a final decision in October 1999,
ruling that the statute in question was unconstitutional. 1 4 6 Since
the separation of powers advisory opinion declined, at least for140. Transcript of Hearing before Hon. Michael A. Silverstein, June 9, 1999, at
18-19. Background on the Lottery Commission case is taken from this transcript
and from Tom Mooney, Court Blocks Expansion of Video Slots, Prov. J. Bull., June
10, 1999, at Al and Tom Mooney, Ruling on Slots Heads to Top Court, Prov. J.
Bull., June 11, 1999, at Al.
141. Hearing, supra note 140, at 19.
142. See Almond v. Rhode Island Lottery Comm'n, No. PC 99-2323, at 1 (June
17, 1999).
143. From notes of the author, who attended the R.I. Supreme Court Hearing
on June 30, 1999.
144. Id. On the extent to which the justices may in fact have answered Questions 2 and 3, see supra Part II.B.
145. Almond v. Rhode Island Lottery Comm'n, No. PC 9972323, at 3-4 (July 27,
1999).
146. See Almond v. Rhode Island Lottery Comm'n, No. PC 99-2323, at 14-15
(Oct. 27, 1999) (holding statute "unconstitutional to the extent that it requires appointments by the House Speaker and Senate Majority Leader of members of the
General Assembly to sit on and comprise a majority of the Lottery Commission
membership").
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mally, to advise on the constitutionality of legislators sitting on
boards and commissions, the extent to which this decision dances
around the advisory opinion is impressive. Over half of the decision's section on the "[Hjistory of This Case" is devoted to the advisory opinion 14 7 and the decision makes considerable efforts to
juggle relevant statements in the advisory opinion with their being
purportedly non-binding: "[Tihe Court is aware that Advisory
Opinions issued by our Supreme Court. .. 'are of limited precedential effect.'"'148 "Be that as it may," the decision continues, "the
Majority Advisory Opinion ... represents the view of four of the
five justices presently sitting on our Supreme Court and is highly
persuasive, if not binding, upon this Court."14 9 The fence-sitting
treatment of the advisory opinion continued as the Lottery Commission decision noted that the majority justices "declined to respond to certain questions propounded to them."150 "However,
while not directly answering the question[si," the justices "did
make particular reference" to the extensive history of the practice
of legislators serving on and appointing others to serve on boards
and commissions, and to "the sole and proper procedure" for changing this practice being a constitutional convention.1 ' The decision
then noted that none of this is dispositive for the Lottery Commission case, and it went on to decide the case on other grounds. However, the justices then ordered a stay of the judgment until July 1,
2000 to allow for "appeals and cross appeals, which inevitably will
15 2
flow" from the decision.
In short, the ill-defined, complicated and strained relation of
the separation of powers advisory opinion to the litigated Lottery
Commission case points to the ambiguities, if not confusions,
which may arise from advisory opinions which are non-binding in
theory but simply impossible to disregard in practice. Whatever
the theory about advisory opinions as non-binding, the likelihood
147. Id. at 2-5.
148. Id. at 9 (quoting from In re Advisory to the Governor, 732 A.2d 55, 73 (R..
1999)). (The justices "realize that [advisory opinions] are of limited precedential
effect.") This is weaker than previous categorical statements on this, e.g., advisory
opinions "can have no weight as a precedent." Taylor & Co. v. Place, 4 R.I. 324,
362 (1856) (emphasis added).
149. Almond, supra note 146, at 9.
150. Id. at 10.
151. Id. at 10-11.
152. Id. at 16.
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that the Ethics Commission would ignore the justices' opinion on
separation of powers and move to enforce Regulation 5014 is nonexistent. Prudence dictates that when the justices of the state's
high court offer advice on a matter of law, it is an offer that cannot
be refused. The effects of an expanding public importance exemption find no mitigation in claims that advisory opinions are nonbinding.
V.

THE PUBLIC IMPORTANCE EXEMPTION AND THE
POLITICAL PROCESS

The justices' expansion of the public importance exemption,
and their consequent weakening of their restrictions on advisory
opinion requests, intensifies the advisory opinion's effects on the
political process. "Under the guise of answering legal and constitutional questions, the judges often play a decisive role in settling
political questions." 153 Advisory opinions are addressed to public
issues, which tend toward the political. "The characteristic agenda
154
of an advisory opinion ...is political rather than adjudicatory."
Reinforcing this concept is the fact that the source of advisory opinions is always one of the political branches, providing two questionable opportunities. One is the ability of the Governor to use the
judiciary to supervise the legislature. 15 5 This was likely the case
with the separation of powers advisory opinion, which the media
accurately, if dramatically, identified as "a tug-of-war for power between the executive and legislative branches." 15 6 The judiciary is
153. Edsall, supra note 127, at 333. See also, e.g., Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, Journal of Debates and Proceedings in the Convention of Delegates 220 (Dec. 30, 1820) (It would be an "extreme danger" if judges "would be
required to give opinions in cases which should be exclusively of a political character."); Calogero, supra note 122, at 367 (The advisory opinion process "involves, or
appears to involve, the judiciary directly in politics."); John F. Hagemann, The Advisory Opinion in South Dakota, 16 S.D. L. Rev. 291, 295 (1971).
154. Kennedy, supra note 119, at 179. See also Massachusetts Constitutional
Convention, Journal of Debates and Proceedings in the Convention of Delegates
284 (Jan. 9, 1821) ("If the question proposed, should be of a public nature, it will be
likely to partake of a political character; and it highly concerns the people that
Judicial Officers should not be involved in political or party discussions.").
155. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 119, at 195 ("When an advisory court provides an executive with unlimited standing to obtain constitutional assessment of
new legislation, the executive branch may employ the judiciary to supervise the
legislative process.").
156. Tom Mooney, Justices Refuse to Ban Legislatorsfrom State Boards, Prov.
J. Bull., June 30, 1999, at Al.
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placed in a position of significant control, or at least influence, over
a political branch through rendering preemptive and non-adjudicatory advice. 157 An offshoot of this is the occasional instance when
the justices go beyond the questions propounded to point to
problems about which no specific inquiry was made. 158
A second opportunity afforded the political branches is to shift
political responsibility to the justices. The advisory opinion process "permits the legislative or executive department to put, in
many important instances, the whole responsibility of their action
upon the judicial department." 159 The very fact that the process is
available may encourage the political branches "to avoid their obligation to assess the constitutionality of what they do or to act according to those assessments .... It is not unknown for legislators
to abdicate their duty to act constitutionally in reliance upon eventual judicial review. Advisory opinions facilitate the
160
abdication."
The public importance exemption increases these two opportunities since it, in effect, waives whatever restrictions might limit
the rendering of an advisory opinion, precisely because of the public-that is, likely, political-importance. The more significant or
intense a political issue purportedly is, the greater the chance of
157. See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 194-95; see also 2 Official Report of the
Debates and Proceedings in the [Massachusetts] State Convention 687 (July 11,
1853) (stating that "[Advisory opinions] have this further objection-that it is very
little different from permitting the judiciary to control the legislative and executive
powers.").
158. See Carberry, supra note 126, at 103. In the separation of powers opinion
the justices may have done this when they opined on the constitutionality of Regulation 5014 itself, about which the Governor did not ask.
159. 2 Official Report, supra note 157, at 687.
160. Kennedy, supra note 119, at 103. This appears to be the case with the
Ethics Commission, which declined to act in accordance with the assessments of its
expert consultant and others about the constitutionality of Regulation 5014; instead they asked the Governor to seek an advisory opinion. The pressure to shift
legislative responsibility to supreme courts occurs generally on the federal as well
as state level. See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and
Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. Rev. 587, 610 (1983):
In addition to the institutional pressures on the Congress to pass the constitutional problems to the courts, the political incentives to do so are
great. The very knowledge that the courts are there, as the ultimate naysayers, increases the tendency to pass the issue on, particularly if it is
politically controversial. Such behavior by Congress is both an abdication
of its role as a constitutional guardian and an abnegation of its duty of
responsible lawmaking.
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the justices applying an exemption. Legislators serving on or appointing others to serve on public boards and commissions is such
an issue, and, as the justices note, the way to restrict this is
through constitutional amendment. 16 1 The amending process is
political, involving debate, negotiation, compromise, lobbying, editorializing and other risky and frustrating activities that are inescapable in the political process. All this is substantially
marginalized if not altogether bypassed when questions of public
importance are withdrawn from the uncertain and contentious
political realm to the non-political realm of the justices. 16 2 For
Justice Frankfurter, "perhaps the most costly price of advisory
opinions is the weakening of legislative and popular responsibility."' 6 3 The converse is true as well: as the availability of advisory
opinions weakens such responsibility, so weak legislative and popular responsibility encourages advisory opinions. Those who disdain the political "will not be unduly distressed if most important
64
controversies are entrusted to the courts for decision."
The expanded public interest exemption encourages this, and
this encouragement is perhaps the most serious civic consequence
of the expansion. The result is not only an evasion of what Brandeis called the duty of public discussion, 6 5 but also the attenuation of the force and effect of whatever public discussion there is.
161. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d at 72.
162. See Christopher Rowland, Senate Asks for Review of CourtRuling, Prov. J.
Bull., Apr. 8, 1997, at B1. In 1997, panelists on a local televised panel show discussed what was called a "power struggle" between the Governor and legislature
over appointment power to fill a vacancy in the position of Lieutenant Governor.
During the program, the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee perfectly depicted the relation between the popular disdain for political controversy and the
desire to shift political issues to the justices for resolution through the advisory
opinion process. She stated:
My inclination would be for us [the Senate] to seek an advisory ....

We

need to be sensitive to public opinion.... People feel.., all we're doing is
fighting ....

My personal inclination would be to receive some direction

from the Supreme Court, a non-controversialmanner, as to whether or not
the legislation I've introduced [on appointment of Lieutenant Governor] is
in fact-would be valid.
Lively Experiment (video recording of broadcast, Jan. 30, 1997) (emphasis added).
163. Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1002,
1007 (1924). Frankfurter takes In re The ConstitutionalConvention, 14 R.I. 649
(1883), as an example of an "ill-considered advisory opinion[ I."
164. Glendon, supra note 1, at 182.
165. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
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From the time the Ethics Commission first promulgated a draft of
what would be Regulation 5014 in October 1995 until the justices
issued their advisory opinion in June 1999, there was considerable
public discussion on the issues involved. But, of course, it did not
matter, formally speaking, because the questions went before the
justices, who should not have been influenced by the public discussion and presumably were not. The effective discussion was in the
briefs and arguments of some fourteen attorneys, all addressed to
the five attorneys who sat as the justices, who in turn deliberated
among themselves. Nineteen attorneys were the effective participants in discussion of the issues that led to the advisory opinion on
one of the century's major political controversies in Rhode Island.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The public importance exemption, then, strengthens the capacity of the advisory opinion process to contract, even impoverish,
public discourse even as it has skewed advisory opinion jurisprudence. The justices asserted in 1993 that they avoid issuing advi16 6
sory opinions in circumstances not constitutionally mandated.
A former Rhode Island chiefjustice, corresponding with a chief justice in another state in 1991, was clear on this. The Rhode Island
justices, he said, "only answer requests for advice if they meet the
criteria set forth in our cases." 167 But in fact these statements
have not been true since 1986. Since then the justices have waived
their criteria in six out of eight advisory opinion requests that were
deficient with respect to the criteria, all on public importance
grounds. The result is an advisory opinion jurisprudence whose
contours are elusive, ambiguous and unpredictable, and whose effect on the political process is questionable.

166. See In re Advisory from Governor, 633 A.2d 664, 666 (R.I. 1993).
167. See Letter from Thomas F. Fay, Rhode Island Chief Justice, to Pascal F.
Calogero, Jr., Louisiana Chief Justice (May 29, 1991) (on file with author).

